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I. PATENT THICKETS AND HOLDOUTS
Many areas of technology are subject to numerous overlapping pat-
ent rights, or a "patent thicket."' A patent thicket exists where there are
numerous different firms holding patents that are legally and technologi-
cally distinct, but overlap to cover a much smaller number of actual or
potential commercial products.2 For example, over five thousand patents
have now been granted in the area of nanotechnology despite the fact that
no nanotech products have yet been commercialized? The standard that
currently covers how digital information is stored on a DVD involves
* J.D., expected May 2007, University of Michigan Law School; B.S. Chemical
Engineering, Brigham Young University. Many thanks to Professor Emily M. Morris at the
University of Michigan Law School for her help.
1. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & EcON. 119 (2001). Shapiro also notes that semicon-
ductors, biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet have been covered by patent
thickets. Id.
2. Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336 (Spring 2005).
3. Michael Berger, The Patent Land Grab in Nanotechnology Continues
Unabated-Creating Problems Down the Road, NEWSWIRETODAY, Mar. 30, 2006, http://
www.newswiretoday.com/news/4569/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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hundreds of different patents and nine different patent holders.4 Property
law and patent law scholars have recently noticed that patent thickets
have the potential to trigger a "tragedy of the anticommons, ' 5 with so
many patent holders in a given area that it is too difficult to secure all of
the necessary licenses to use the technology. The transaction and coordi-
nation costs essential to secure the licenses deters many firms who
would otherwise implement patented technology. 6 The result of the
"tragedy of the anticommons" in a patent thicket is inefficient under-use
of innovations by the public.'
Typically, companies that wish to commercialize technology covered
by a patent thicket join together to form a standard-setting organization,
a patent pool, or a licensing regime.' Standard-setting organizations are
industry groups created to set common technical standards, allowing
compatibility between products made by different manufacturers. 9 A sin-
gle common standard reduces the number of patents that must be
secured to commercialize a given technology, thereby mitigating the an-
ticommons problem. Standard-setting organizations can create
significant consumer benefits, especially in "network markets," where
the value of a product to a particular consumer is a function of how
many other consumers use a compatible product.' Patent pools are also
frequently run by industry participants, and are most common in thick-
eted areas of technology where the boundary between patent rights is
unclear." Patent pools seek to ameliorate the anticommons problem by
requiring participants in the pool to license their patents on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms.'2 But, unlike standard-setting organiza-
tions, patent pools often do not have a technical aspect beyond what is
necessary to determine royalty rates. 3 Both standard-setting organiza-
tions and patent pools typically attempt to identify and organize relevant
4. DVD 6C Licensing Agency, Patent List, http://www.dvd6cla.comlpatentlist-
15.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
5. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621-
625 (1998); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698 (1998).
6. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
9. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 CALIF. L. REv. 1889, 1893 (2002).
10. See Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?, June
8, 2000, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/standards.pdf.
11. Merges, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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patent holders such that those interested in implementing the technology
can license the necessary patents collectively through some sort of li-
censing regime.' 4 While formed for slightly different purposes, standard-
setting organizations, patent pools, and their attendant licensing regimes
behave similarly in most respects, and will be treated interchangeably in
this Note.
Importantly, at least a few relevant patent holders are inevitably left
out of an industry organization's collection of patents.'5 These left-out
patent holders, known as "holdouts," can undermine the collective ar-
rangement with demand letters and infringement suits.' 6 The timing of a
holdout's demand for royalties from the organization or from the organi-
zation's licensees can be affected by the holdout's expected recovery
from a successful infringement suit.'7 A holdout who demands royalties
prior to the final organization of the patent collection can only demand a
royalty that reflects the additional value that his new patent adds to the
collection. If the holdout demands more than this value, the organiza-
tion will work around the holdout's patent by adopting a different
standard, adjusting the patent pool to cover slightly different technology,
or simply dissolving itself." By contrast, a holdout that demands royal-
ties after a standard has gained widespread acceptance or after a licensing
regime has been set firmly in place is in a stronger negotiating position.0
This holdout can demand not only the marginal value of his patent, but
also the switching costs that would be incurred if the established standard
14. See, e.g., John Curley, Via Licensing Issues A Call For Patents, MICROWAVES & RF,
Nov. 2006, http://www.mwrf.com/Articles/Index.cfm?Ad=l&ArticlelD=14056 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2007) (Call for RFID patents); Business Wire Staff, Via Licensing Expands Call for
Patents for Its IEEE 802.16 Patent Licensing Program, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 16, 2006, http://
www.findarticles.comp/articles/ni_mOEIN/is 2006_Jan_16?pnum=2&opg=n 16001872 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007) (call for Mobile WiMAX patents); Bill Rosenblatt, Call for Patents in
the DRAI Space, DRM WATCH, Oct. 2, 2003, http://www.drmwatch.comdrmtech/
article.php/309403 i (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
15. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003).
16. Id.
17. See Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process, (Univ.
of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), http:/ ssrn.com/abstract=902646
(last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
18. Id.
19. See Rudi Bekkers, Eric Iversen & Knut Blind, Patent pools and non-assertion
agreements: coordination mechanisms for multi-party IPR holders in standardization, August
23-26, 2006, http://www2.unil.ch/easst2006/Papers/B/Bekkers%20Iversen%20Blind.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2007).
20. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, U.
TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2007).
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or licensing regime were limited by a court injunction.2' For example, if
a firm must redesign its product or retool its assembly line to change
away from an infringing standard, the firm will be willing to settle with
this holdout for any amount up to the cost associated with a redesign or
retool. In this way, this holdout can receive a royalty payment far in ex-
cess of the value of the actual infringed patented technology. However, it
is uncertain whether this type of holdout remains in such a strong bar-
gaining position after the Supreme Court's recent decision in eBay v.
MercExchange.22 If an organization licensing an existing collection of
patents is no longer threatened with an automatic injunction after a suc-
cessful infringement suit, holdouts appear to have lost an important
incentive to sue, or to delay joining the collection in the first place.
In a patent thicket with many overlapping rights, a licensing regime
is actually less susceptible to infringement suits merely because of the
sheer number potential holdouts.23 If there are only one or two holdouts,
the recoverable switching costs provide a strong incentive to demand
royalties from infringing firms with significant costs sunk into an estab-
lished regime, as mentioned above. But, a large number of holdouts with
a corresponding large number of possible infringement suits reduces this
incentive, as the switching costs extracted from the infringing firms must
be split among the holdouts. 4 Therefore, analogous to the eBay decision,
the mere existence of a patent thicket in a given area of technology
would be expected to lower, first, the incentive to holdout and, second,
the incentive for holdouts to sue. Under the influence of two overlapping
forces lowering the incentive to holdout and sue, holdout behavior in
patent thickets after eBay will pose interesting new concerns for the U.S.
patent system.
The first part of this Note explains why holdouts exist in the first
place, given the benefits of joining an organization of collected patents.
In the second part of this Note, I explore the lack of legal protections
against holdout demands offered by pre-eBay patent law. The third part
of this Note introduces the eBay decision as revolutionary addition to list
of legal protections against holdouts. To conclude, I speculate on the ef-
fects of eBay in areas of technology currently covered by patent thickets.
21. Id.
22. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
23. Lichtman, supra note 17, at 3.
24. Id.
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II. WHY ARE THERE HOLDOUTS?
Organizations charged with the task of implementing a new standard
or new licensing regime often begin by publicly soliciting the potentially
necessary patents. For example, the organization involved with setting
the standards that govern the Blu-Ray Disc announced to the public last
November that it was seeking to identify any patent that might be essen-
tial to develop a new standard.25 Many patent holders respond to these
calls in order to influence the development of the new standard and to
encourage its adoption,26 thereby ensuring substantial royalty payments
further down the road.
Besides the incentive to influence the development of a new stan-
dard, many patent holders respond to a call for patents in order to secure
favorable cross-licensing arrangements from organization participants
for complementary products they wish to sell.27 These patent holders are
likely to be repeat players within the industry, who are understandably
hesitant to instigate patent litigation for fear of souring relationships with
other industry players. So, instead of holding out for a chance to recover
switching costs, these patent holders license their patents to the collec-
tion in exchange for assurance that the other patent holders in the
collection will likewise license their patents under similar terms. For ex-
ample, the CEO of Applied Wireless Identifications Group has said that
"incorporating companies' patents into a standard isn't necessarily a bad
thing ... because the patent holders are often willing to donate some
patents at no cost and license the rest at favorable terms., 2' This type of
tradeoff is appealing to patent holders who cannot be drawn out by the
mere opportunity to influence the adoption of a new standard.
However, a public solicitation of patents inevitably leaves a few
relevant patent holders out of the new collection.29 Some patent holders
will simply not realize that their inventions fall under the soon to be
adopted standard or within the area of a new patent pool. Later, that
holder, or a subsequent assignee, will discover the relevant patent and
demand royalties from those who have already spent money on switch-
ing to the new standard or on licensing from the new pool. For example,
25. Press Release, MPEG LA Announces Plan for Blu- Ray Disc Patent License (Nov.
9, 2005), http://www.mpegla.com/news/n_05-11-09_bluray.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
26. Mark A. Lemley, supra note 9, at 1893.
27. Mark A. Lemley, Rationale Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 1495,
1504-1505 (2001).
28. Susan Kuchinskas, Patent Suit Roils RFID Standards Groups, INTERNETNEWS.COM,
Jun. 8, 2004, http://www.internetnews.com/infra/article.php/3364911 (last visited Feb. 19,
2007).
29. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 20-21.
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Forgent Networks recently launched a patent infringement lawsuit
against thirty one major computer and electronics vendors, seeking dam-
ages related to its recently discovered claim to the technology underlying
the widespread JPEG file format. 0
Other patent holders left out of the new collection are purposeful
holdouts. These holdouts are not sufficiently enticed by the opportunity
to influence a new standard or to secure favorable licensing arrange-
ments for complementary products. These holdouts are likely to be
smaller firms and non-producers, sometimes referred to as "patent
trolls," who have few relationships at stake within the industry. For them,
the potential royalties, infringement damages, and recoverable switching
costs outweigh any incentive to respond to a solicitation of patents. Al-
though purposeful holdouts are undoubtedly plentiful, concrete evidence
of purposeful holdouts is scarce because such evidence gives rise to the
doctrine of laches, as discussed in the second part of this Note.'
An organization charged with the task of implementing a new stan-
dard or licensing regime cannot identify every potential holdout merely
by searching the database on the Patent Office website. Every patent
holder is entitled to be his own lexicographer to describe his invention,32
so written descriptions of inventions can vary wildly, even in the same
area of technology. Due to the sheer volume of patents, holdouts are es-
pecially difficult to identify in an area of technology covered by a patent
thicket. Exacerbating this problem, patent language is subject to inter-
pretation by the courts. This can make any attempt at delineating the
exact scope of patent an exercise in futility. According to the recent case
of Phillips v. AWH, the Federal Circuit's opinion on claim construction is
the only "true" opinion regarding the scope of a patent.3 In a patent sys-
tem with so much uncertainty, and over 1.9 million patents in force, 
3
identifying every holdout is an impossible proposition. Purposeful hold-
outs are aware of the ease of avoiding detection, and typically do not
actively seek to conceal themselves, because such a deception can give
30. Matt Hines, Graphics patent suit targets Dell, others, CNET, April 23, 2004, http://
news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5198582.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
31. See discussion, infra text accompanying notes 45-48. Rambus is probably the best
known example of a purposeful holdout. After withdrawing from a standard setting organiza-
tion in 1995, Rambus filed new patent applications to cover features of the organization's
pending SDRAM standard. See Wikipedia, Rambus, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rambus (last
visited Feb 15, 2007).
32. Renishaw v. Marposs Societal Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
33. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
34. Brad Smith, Q&A: Microsoft Calls for Reforms to the U.S. Patent System, MICRO-
SOFT PRESSPASS, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.microsoft.compresspass/features/2005/mar05/03-
10patentreform.mspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
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rise to the doctrine of estoppel (also discussed in the second part of this
Note).35
For those organizations that wish to undertake the time and expense
to search for potential holdouts, there is an additional concern. The sim-
ple act of searching for holdouts may actually increase the damages an
undiscovered holdout can recover in future litigation. If the organization
happens across a future holdout's patent during its search, but does not
realize the patent's scope or relevance, the organization may have just
created liability for treble damages at trial under the law of willful patent
infringement.16 However, a holdout cannot prove willful patent infringe-
ment if the infringing organization had no knowledge that the patent
existed.37 An organization that engages in a search for potential holdouts
may lose this defense." The risk of being found guilty of willful patent
infringement is why many firms forbid employees from looking at issued
patents while on the job.3 9
Patents that have not yet issued cannot be searched on the Patent Of-
fice website, further complicating efforts to identify potential holdouts.
In addition, patent applications may not be published until at least eight-
een months'° after being filed and can be filed up to a year after the
invention becomes publicly known.4 ' Therefore, the basis for a claim of
infringement may not surface until two and a half years after a given
standard or licensing regime has been established. It is also possible that
the patent office may inadvertently create new holdouts, even if the in-
fringed claims are filed well after a new standard has been adopted.
Because the patent office is not especially good at weeding out non-
novel and obvious inventions, unethical firms might secure a patent in
anticipation of an obvious improvement to an already established stan-
dard, thereby positioning itself as a new holdout when the organization
in charge of the standard adopts the improvement. This practice has been
described as "patent flooding," wherein a firm seeking to become a hold-
out files numerous patent applications claiming minor or incremental
35. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54.
36. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is
well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful infringement or bad
faith").
37. See generally, Robert 0. Bolan & William C. Rooklidge, Imputing Knowledge to
Determine Willful Patent Infringement, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 157 (1996).
38. Id.
39. 2003 Patent Quality Improvement Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2006).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
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variations on a technology developed by a target organization. Search-
ing the patent office website obviously cannot provide a remedy against
these types of later-arising holdouts.
III. PATENT LAW PROTECTIONS AGAINST HOLDOUTS
Licensing organizations have some contractual tools to discourage
holdouts, such as provisions for sanctions and cross-licensing arrange-
ments that prohibit inflated royalty payment to holdouts. However, these
types of contractual agreements are limited by antitrust concerns.43 An
organization and its members can face antitrust liability by failing to dis-
close or refusing to license a patent covering a standard, or collaborating
to compel a license from a patent owner, as discussed in the last section
of this Note." There are also several patent law doctrines that may offer
protection from undisclosed holdouts. Most of these are severely limited
in scope, but the U.S. Supreme Court's recent eBay decision regarding
permanent injunctions may offer new hope to organizations in a patent
thicket facing an infringement suit by a holdout.
Under the doctrine of laches, a court can deny recovery for damages
incurred prior to the filing of an infringement case if the holdout delayed
filing suit for an unreasonable amount of time and that delay materially
injured the infringer.4 ' The line between a reasonable and unreasonable
delay in filing suit is left up to the courts, but a delay of more than six
years is presumed to invoke laches in patent infringement situations.46 In
theory, laches can be used as an effective defense by an organization ac-
cused of infringement after a new standard or licensing regime has been
established. But, in practice, laches is not often successful because of the
discretion given to the courts to completely ignore the doctrine.47 And
even if laches is granted, the infringing organization is still liable for
damages and subject to an injunction from the date of filing suit on-
42. Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the United States and Japan, 40 IDEA
393, 393 (2000).
43. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 28. (noting that many organization believe their job is
"merely to set technical standards, not to get involved in 'prices,' including the terms on which
intellectual property will be made available to other participants.")
44. Lemley, supra note 9, at 1927-35; see infra text accompanying notes 103-105.
45. Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Manufacturing Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
46. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1034-35
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Courts faced with patent infringement actions 'borrowed' the six-year dam-
age limitation period in the patent statute now set out in section 286, as the time period for
giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of laches.")
47. Id. at 1036.
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ward.48 Therefore, the doctrine of laches fails to mitigate the most sig-
nificant incentive to holdout, the recovery of switching costs.
A rough reflection of the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of estoppel
excuses infringement after the filing of suit. 9 To qualify for estoppel, the
infringing organization must first show that the holdout communicated
"in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence" that he would
not sue for infringement.0 Secondly, the organization must have relied
on the holdout's representation and the holdout must have behaved in
such a way that the organization would be "harmed materially if the
[holdout] is later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his ear-
lier conduct."'" A leading example of estoppel in the patent context can
be found in the FTC's consent agreement with Dell Computer Corpora-
tion. 2 According to the FTC:
"During the standard-setting process, VESA [Video Electronics
Standard Association] asked its members to certify whether they
had any patents, trademarks, or copyrights that conflicted with
the proposed VL-bus standard; Dell certified that it had no such
intellectual property rights. After VESA adopted the standard-
based in part, on Dell's certification-Dell sought to enforce its
patent against firms planning to follow the standard. 53
Like the doctrine of laches, the doctrine of estoppel appears to pro-
vide an effective defense for an organization accused of infringement
after a new standard or licensing regime has been established. But, in the
absence of an explicit certification like the one made by Dell, the first
requirement to prove estoppel is very difficult to fulfill. While an organi-
zation accused of infringement by a holdout has almost always made
significant investments in a new standard, an infringing organization
must show something more than a long delay in filing suit to invoke es-
toppel. Estoppel only applies if the holdout previously agreed not to sue
the infringing organization or the holdout filed suit and then delayed fur-
ther action for a long period of time.- Holdouts looking to cash-in after a
standard has been established have few reasons to engage in this sort of
behavior.
48. Id. at 1040.
49. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Products, Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
50. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041-42.
51. Id. at 1041.
52. Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/06/de1I2.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2007).
53. Id.
54. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1041-42.
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IV. EBAY'S PROTECTION AGAINST HOLDOUTS
Another doctrine in patent law that may reduce the damages a hold-
out can recover stems from 35 U.S.C. § 283. Section 283 authorizes a
court to "grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity" in
patent infringement suits "on such terms as the court deems reasonable."
Before the Supreme Court handed down the eBay v. MercExchange deci-
sion, lower courts read Section 283 to always favor automatic injunctions
against patent infringers, absent extraordinary circumstances. 5' After eBay,
courts are freer to consider public policy and fairness considerations be-
fore granting injunctive relief in response to patent infringement. Most
importantly, this decision has the potential to provide an effective de-
fense against patent holdouts seeking to recover switching costs.
The aftermath of the eBay decision is still uncertain, as even the Su-
preme Court Justices seem divided on the appropriate criteria for issuing
an injunction. eBay could be seen as a victory for holdouts, given the
language of Justice Thomas that a patent holder's "willingness to license
its patents" and "its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents"
is insufficient to establish a lack irreparable harm if an injunction did not
56issue. Thomas goes on to note that some patent holders that opt not to
"bring their works to market themselves . .. may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor [injunction] test."57 This statement seems encour-
aging to holdouts who do not join a standard-setting organization or
licensing regime. In addition, Thomas recognizes that holdouts can be
deserving of injunctive relief and that a categorical rule denying them
such relief is not permissible under the Patent Act. 8 Overall, this lan-
guage sounds promising to potential holdouts leveraging their patents
only to recover switching costs.
On the other hand, some of the Court's other language is not at all
favorable to holdouts. With the discretion regarding an injunction being
placed in the hands of individual district courts, and automatic injunc-
tions no longer mandated by the Federal Circuit, many district court
judges may use the language of Justice Kennedy's concurrence as an
opportunity to deny injunctive relief to holdouts. Kennedy writes that the
"right to exclude does not dictate" an automatic injunctive remedy if an
infringer uses an invention against the patentee's wishes.59 Kennedy
notes that the traditional four-factor test might not be satisfied with cer-
55. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 E3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1842.
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tain types of patents, such as patents covering "a small component of the
product the [infringer] seeks to produce," and patents used "not as a ba-
sis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees "'6 He also recognizes the holdout problem; "an injunction,
and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.", t To solve this problem,
Kennedy proposes that if "an injunction is employed simply for undue
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to com-
pensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest.''62 So, in response to eBay, lower courts may begin to recognize
and define circumstances where Section 283 injunctive relief is not ap-
propriate for holdouts. These circumstances could include those where a
holdout remains silent as firms begin investment in a new standard, or
where injunctive relief would allow a holdout to extract switching costs
in the form of a royalty far in excess of the value of the infringed patent
itself.
In the terminology of the law-and-economics literature, Kennedy
proposes that certain holdout patent rights be protected with a "liability
rule," rather than a "property rule."63 The absence of injunctive relief un-
der the eBay decision creates, in effect, a compulsory licensing regime
based on a liability rule, under which infringement is permitted at a price
determined by a court.6 A liability rule is typically thought to be favor-
able if a court's determination of the true value of the property would be
more efficient than a evaluation reached by private agreement, and con-
versely, a property rule is favored if the private evaluation would be more
efficient.6 The result of this analysis in the context of patents is that
property rules backed by injunctive relief are generally favored because
private firms are faster and more accurate than courts at valuing patents.
66
However, the holdout problem may present an exception to the prefer-
ence for property rules in the patent system, as the efficiencies of a
private valuation are lost when a patent holdout has little incentive to
join a patent collection and demands a royalty rate far in excess of the
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
64. Burk and Lemley have suggested compulsory licensing as means to clear patent
thickets in the semiconductor industry. Burk & Lemley, supra note 15, at 1695.
65. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 63.
66. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994).
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value of the holdout's innovation. Without a liability rule to allow some
infringement (subject only to a royalty determined ex post by a court)
under these exceptional circumstances, the public may lose both the
benefits of a widespread standard, as well as the benefits of the holdout's
innovation.68
Interestingly, there seems to be pre-existing case law regarding the
calculation of damages in an infringement suit that lower courts could
easily adopt into the considerations surrounding injunctive relief. A court
typically awards compensatory monetary damages in an infringement
case "of the amount necessary to restore the owner to the financial posi-
tion he would have enjoyed had the infringer not engaged in
unauthorized acts. 69 One standard method of calculating compensatory
damages is a reasonable royalty; "the royalty that willing parties would
have agreed to had they negotiated a license under the patent., 70 When
calculating a reasonable royalty, courts measure the value of the infring-
ing patent in comparison to non-infringing alternative designs at the time
of infringement.
7
'
However, as it now stands, a reasonable royalty award is designed to
reflect only the value the infringed patent adds to the infringing product,
but does not take into account the more lucrative switching costs a hold-
out can demand 2 This leaves a successful holdout with a significant
windfall. To avoid this windfall, courts could trace reasonable royalty
considerations onto the framework of injunctions against holdouts, com-
paring the value of the infringing standard or pool with the value of an
alternative standard or pool designing around the holdout, had the hold-
out been known to the organization at the time the standard or pool was
67. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986-89 (1999); but see Merges, supra note 8 (arguing that
licensing organizations can mitigate the inefficiencies of a liability rule).
68. Id.
69. Donald S. Chisum, 7 Chisum on Patents § 20.03 (2007).
70. Id.
71. Joy Technologies v. Flakt, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 796, 803 (D. Del. 1996). It should be
noted that the proposed Patent Reform Act (H.R. 2795) may alter the court's calculation of a
reasonable royalty. H.R. 2795 would add the following language to 35 U.S.C. § 284: "In de-
termining a reasonable royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, if
relevant and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to
the inventive contribution as distinguished from other features of the combination, the manu-
facturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
infringer." See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. vs. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stating consistent language).
72. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have proposed a game-theory model to correct for
switching costs when calculating a reasonable royalty rate. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20,
at 4.
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set. If the difference in value is small, it follows that the infringed patent
adds little value to the existing standard or pool, and the holdout would
be denied injunctive relief. Even though importing these reasonable roy-
alty considerations into injunctive relief considerations seems like a
natural consequence of the eBay decision, lower courts have not yet con-
sidered arguments like this. On the other hand, it should be noted that
there are other public policy considerations supporting a reliable patent
system enforced by guaranteed injunctive relief. Setting a minimum dif-
ference in the value of two standards or pools as a prerequisite to
injunctive relief might be too arbitrary for the courts to apply consis-
tently.
As of this writing, there have been two post-eBay lower court deci-
sions denying a permanent injunction to a patentee after finding that the
patent in question was valid and infringed. These two cases are z4 Tech-
nologies v. Microsoft Corp.73 and Paice v. Toyota,74 both from the Eastern
District of Texas. The court held that Paice and z4 were geared primarily
toward licensing the infringed patents, and they could not show how
their licensing activities would be irreparably harmed in the absence of
an injunction. 7- Also, the public interest weighed against an injunction
because, as large producers, Microsoft and Toyota would face significant
economic hardships if enjoined.7 6 The court's decision in z4 specifically
relied on the language of the Kennedy concurrence in eBay, stating that
"the infringing product activation component of the software is in no
way related to the core functionality ... Kennedy's comments support
the conclusion that monetary damages would be sufficient to compensate
z4 for any future infringement [by Microsoft]." '77 While z4 and Paice are
not holdouts from a licensing regime, as specifically discussed in this
78Note, these two cases represent a willingness of at least one lower court
to rely on Kennedy's concurring opinion, instead of Thomas's majority
opinion, when considering the appropriateness of an injunction. Since
participants in patent pools are likely to be large manufacturers, and a
holdout's infringed patent is likely to represent only a small contribution
to the total technology in a patent pool, a holdout's prospects for an in-
junction post-eBay appear to have slimmed.
73. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
74. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
16, 2006).
75. z4at440-41;Paiceat 13.
76. z4 at 443-44; Paice at 16.
77. z4 at 441.
78. z4 has been cited with approval by a Delaware District court in the case of IMX,
Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1972 at *57 (D. Del. Jan. 10, 2007).
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V. HOLDOUT INCENTIVES IN PATENT THICKETS AFTER EBAY
Given the current state of patent law protections, it is no surprise that
patent thickets tend to reduce the incentive for holdouts to sue for royal-
ties after a patent collection and licensing regime have been
established.79 As mentioned, a holdout demanding royalties prior to the
finalization of the collection can only demand the additional value that
his new patent adds. And, leaving the eBay decision aside for just a mo-
ment, a holdout that demands royalties after a standard has gained
widespread acceptance can demand not only the marginal value of his
patent, but also recover up to the switching costs that would be incurred
if the established standard or licensing regime were subject to an injunc-
tion. Switching costs could include retooling an assembly line, retraining
a workforce, rewriting software, renegotiating with licensees, and replac-
ing infringing products. It follows that switching costs are likely to be
highest in industries reliant on a physical product operating under a
wide-spread standard. 0
However, the greater number of holdouts that demand royalties after
a standard has been established, the fewer switching costs each holdout
can recover.8' For example, if each of ten different holdouts can force an
infringing firm to shut down and retool their assembly line, the value of
the switching costs can be split up to ten ways. The infringing firm will
not be willing to settle for any more than the total switching costs, which
sets a ceiling on the potential royalties paid to the holdouts as a group. If
one holdout demands the maximum royalty, the next holdout will follow,
splitting the potential recovery in two. The next holdouts will follow this
pattern until the marginal cost of demanding a royalty, including the pos-
sible costs of litigation, becomes greater than the value of the next
holdout's fractional share of the switching costs. For this reason, indi-
vidual holdouts are understandably hesitant to demand a royalty or to
bring suit in patent thickets, for fear of instigating this marginal behavior
by other holdouts. This assumes, of course, that each holdout is able to
sue simultaneously and is well-informed of the existence of the other
82holdouts, which may not always be the case.
79. See Lichtman, supra note 17, at 3.
80. High switching costs helps explain why RIM, a firm heavily reliant on a physical
product operating under a wide-spread standard, agreed to pay $612.5 million to NTP to re-
solve a patent dispute, rather than risk an injunction. Tom Krazit & Anne Broache, BlackBerry
saved, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 3, 2006, http://news.com.com/BlackBerry+saved/2100-
1047_3-6045880.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
81. See Lichtman, supra note 17, at 3.
82. Id. at 10.
What is Hiding in the Bushes?
At the extreme, a patent thicket may become so dense that the cov-
ered area of technology mimics the public domain.83 An ultra-dense
patent thicket, like the public domain, would contain so many contribu-
tions from different rights holders that each potential holdout's incentive
to sue reduces to virtually zero.M There is evidence of this effect in the
extremely lenient cross-licensing agreements and defensive approach to
patenting typical of the software industry. 5 For example, IBM makes its
intellectual property freely available to all legitimate users who are will-
ing to grant parallel access to the user's own intellectual property.
s6
While this lenient enforcement behavior is still licensing in the formal
sense, it mirrors many behaviors found in the public domain. For exam-
ple, software programmers rarely pay any attention to prior art patents
when creating new intellectual property. Because a dense patent thicket
mitigates holdout incentives to sue in much the same way the eBay deci-
sion does, one might expect the eBay decision to spread the public
domain mimicry found in ultra-dense patent thickets to more sparsely
populated patent thickets covering other areas of technology. For exam-
ple, if a district court denies one holdout's request for a permanent
injunction against a certain licensing regime, other holdouts from that
regime may decide to license their patents in exchange for access to
some of regime's existing intellectual property, rather than demand a
royalty. As more injunctions are denied at the district court level, it
would not be surprising to see numerous technology firms adopt more
numerous and more lenient cross-licensing agreements in the wake of
eBay.
The dynamics within a patent thicket also reduce the incentive to be-
come a holdout in the first place.8 Obviously, a smaller share of
potential royalties provides less incentive to patent holders to strategi-
cally delay joining a collection of patents. However, pre-eBay, the
number of holdouts would not likely reduce to zero, because the last po-
tential holdouts would realize there are fewer and fewer holdouts
competing for the potential switching costs. But now, the uncertainty of
an injunction after eBay could further reduce the number of holdouts,
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 961 (2005).
86. Id. at 1005. ("IBM's relative lenience also is attributed to the asymmetric risks IBM
faces in patent litigation. A finding that IBM's widely distributed products infringe a valid
patent is likely to cost IBM much more than a finding of infringement by a small party with a
limited customer base involved in litigation with IBM.")
87. Id. at 1004.
88. See Lichtman, supra note 17, at 10.
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possibly to zero. Because of the uncertainty in being able to secure an
injunction after a standard or regime has been set by an organization, the
recoverable switching cost are of less economic value. By further reduc-
ing both the incentive to hold out and the incentive for existing holdouts
to sue, eBay magnifies the natural disadvantages for holdouts previously
found only in patent thickets. With eBay magnifying these disadvantages
across all industries, one would expect a decrease in the overall level of
patent litigation, and an increase in the number and size of patent collec-
tions, as holdouts seek to join licensing regimes and patent pools, rather
than sue.
An overall decrease in patent litigation, nice as it sounds, may not be
beneficial in all circumstances. One can imagine that certain firms, be-
ginning with those enjoying the double-layered protection of both eBay
and a dense patent thicket without a well-established standard-setting
organization, might try and forgo licensing patents completely. These
firms would rely on a large number of holdouts and the uncertainty of an
injunction to stave off royalty demands. 9 If enough firms pursued this
course, certain areas of technology currently covered by dense patent
thickets might be converted into a de facto public domain, without even
token licensing agreements between patent rights holders.
For instance, suppose the current collection of nanotech patent hold-
ers never successfully adopts an industry-wide licensing regime or patent
pool. It is improbable that any of the current individual nanotech patent
holders would instigate litigation against a smaller-sized firm infringing
hundreds of nanotech patents with an infringing product, unless that
firm's product became highly successful and switching costs grew suffi-
ciently. The uncertainty of an injunction for any one patent holder
seeking relief based solely on a single patent covering a minor area of
the infringing product, coupled with the risk that other holdouts would
also sue and split the small amount of damages, would act as an effective
deterrent. While the public policy merits of this outcome are debatable,
the effective conversion of a patented technology area into a de facto
public domain technology area would surely lead to decreased faith in
the U.S. patent system. If a single valid patent covering a small portion
of an infringing product can no longer be profitably litigated in the
courts, the patent's value is greatly diminished. Professor Richard Ep-
stein foresaw this problem in an editorial published just before the eBay
case was decided.
89. This builds on Litchman's idea that a firm in patent thicket might "throw[] caution
to the wind, ignoring all patents relevant to a given standard." Id. at 10-11.
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Just as we don't like some holdouts after the fact, we also don't
like firms that take the law into their own hands by consciously
deciding that it is cheaper to infringe than to purchase. Yet once
the use of the injunction is relaxed at the back end of a transac-
tion, then every firm can circumvent the law, hoping to profit
from its own wrong.... The holdout problem is only one form
of abuse. Deliberate infringement is the far greater risk.'°
The nanotech scenario proposed above is certainly plausible, but still
unlikely, especially since eBay tends to discourage large numbers of
holdouts and encourage more complete patent collections by suppressing
the incentive for holdouts to litigate. A more likely outcome is that or-
ganizations charged with collecting patents, setting standards, and
creating licensing regimes will become more numerous and more power-
ful.
Under the eBay standard, obtaining an injunction under the tradi-
tional four-factor test stems from "an act of equitable discretion"9' based,
at least partially, on the patent holder's use of the infringed patent. Some
commentators have inferred from this that the economic value of a pat-
ent now depends on whether or not it is being licensed, and by whom.9
For instance, a large manufacturer actively cross-licensing patents within
a patent pool can show an irreparable injury due to infringement, which
favors an injunction under the first traditional factor, more easily than a
smaller holdout using the same patent for litigation purposes only. Be-
cause these large manufacturing firms have a higher likelihood of
obtaining an injunction if infringement occurs, the patent is of more eco-
nomic value in their hands. In this way, the gap in patent value between
different patent holders, as created by eBay, will spur more licenses and
patent assignments from smaller holdouts to larger organizations. 9 Large
firms that rely heavily on licensing, such as IBM, and large firms that
rely heavily on standard-setting, such a Microsoft, stand to gain signifi-
cantly from this scenario.
This will create new problems of cartel-like behavior by these types of
firms, possibly resulting in insurmountable barriers to entry for smaller
firms due to abusive cross-licensing arrangements. When considering
whether or not to obtain a license to holdout's patent, standard-setting
90. Richard A. Epstein, A Kind Word for MercExchange, FT.coM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/c96aea22-72 1b-I lda-9ff7-0000779e2340.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
91. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
92. Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court Vacates eBay Injunction, PATENTLY-O: PATENT
LAW BLOG, May 16, 2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/supreme_court_v.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
93. Id.
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organizations can act as a "license-buying cartel" by negotiating jointly
as an industry group to obtain the license for a lower price than if they
bargained individually.94 Standard-setting organizations can also serve as
a defensive cartel against holdout infringement suits asserted against
several firms in an industry. 95 The member of the organization may agree
to share litigation costs, jointly hire lawyers, or sign agreements that
bind members not to settle independently.9 Indeed, some early industry
licensing regimes were apparently formed primarily to coerce holdouts
to agree to lower licensing fees by preventing members from settling
patent infringement suits independently.9 Because a joint defense
against holdout suits involves concerted action by firms that should be
competitors, it raises many of the same antitrust concerns as a traditional
cartel.98 Under antitrust law, organization members with common inter-
ests who act jointly must retain independent decision-making authority.99
"If they act in concert in deciding not just how to litigate the case, but
whether to settle and on what grounds, they cross the line into a conspir-
acy to restrain trade."' The Second Circuit recently held in a copyright
case that a conspiracy between intellectual property owners not to settle
an infringement suit could violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'0 ' That
court emphasized that "copyright holders may not agree to limit their
individual freedom of action in licensing future rights to such an in-
fringer. ' 2
Similarly, in a scenario that may become more common after eBay,
opportunistic standard-setting organizations in patent thickets might at-
tempt to take advantage of smaller patent holders when considering
adoption of an improvement to an existing standard. The larger organiza-
tion might purposely offer unfavorable royalty-free terms to any smaller
patent holder wishing to join the patent collection, causing many of them
to holdout. The organization could then expropriate the holdouts' innova-
tive improvements without risking an injunction, because the smaller
holdouts would have difficulty showing an irreparable injury. And,
should any of the holdouts go through the time and expense of litigation,
94. Lemley, supra note 9, at 1940.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technol-
ogy, and Politics in America, 171-76 (Cambridge University Press 2002) (discussing the
Eastern and Western Railroad Associations).
98. Lemley, supra note 9, at 1940.
99. Id. at 1942.
100. Id.
101. Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, Inc., 219 F.3d 92 (2d. Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 103.
What is Hiding in the Bushes?
they would recover damages based only on a reasonable royalty for the
fraction of the value of the improvement in the standard. Of course, the
opportunistic organization must be careful not to run afoul of antitrust
and willful infringement laws while implementing this tactic.'°3 If suc-
cessfully implemented, this tactic would discourage smaller firms from
research and development in technological areas already dominated by
existing standards or licensing regimes.
That is not to say a strong cartels would form in every patent thicket,
or that cartels could not be broken, once formed. There are always trans-
action costs, coordination costs, and antitrust concerns hampering the
smooth operation of standard-setting organizations, which increase with
the density of the patent thicket. '°4 The radio frequency identification tag
industry is mired in its own patent thicket, and has only recently man-
aged to form a standard-setting organization, which still lacks at least
one major industry participant.' 5 Patent collections are often dissolved,
not directly because of a holdout's infringement suit, but rather because
the suit reveals an inherent weakness in the collection itself. When a
smaller holdout threatens a large standard-setting organization, each firm
within the organization reconsiders whether to remain in the cartel or
become a holdout and attack other members. In this way, a patent pool is
never truly free of potential holdouts, as firms can leave the organization
at any time, subject to contractual obligations. For instance, if the DVD
standard becomes less important with the introduction of the Blu-Ray
Disc, a holdout suit could easily trigger the dissolution of the DVD li-
censing organization, creating at least nine new holdouts. These new
holdouts would then decide whether it is in their best interest to demand
royalties from the other industry players, taking into account many of the
considerations mentioned in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Inside patent thickets, eBay's tendency to create either a de facto
public domain or patent-collecting organizations with strong market
power offers two potential solutions to the "anticommons" problem.
However, these solutions are not without their own drawbacks, and it is
103. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 22 ("Antitrust liability has been found for participants in a
standard-setting process who abuse that process to exclude competitors from the market.");
see Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
104. See Shapiro, supra note I.
105. Renee Boucher Ferguson, RFID Group Targets Patent Woes, Dev Source, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.devsource.com/article2/0,1759,1848971,00.asp?kc=DSNKT403KTX1K0000642 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007).
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still unclear whether eBay leads to improved efficiency in the use of in-
novations in areas of technology covered by patent thickets. Even though
eBay mitigates the costs associated with a failure to license, it also ex-
poses the weakness of a patent system un-enforced by automatic
injunctions or prone to abuse by patent cartels.
